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A bst r act
Neoliberal economics play a significant role in US social organization, imposing market
logics on public services and driving the cultural valorization of free market ideology.
The neoliberal ‘project of inequality’ is upheld by an authoritarian system of
punishment built around the social control of the underclass—among them
unauthorized immigrants. This work lays out the theory of the punishment
marketplace: a conceptualization of how US systems of punishment both enable the
neoliberal project of inequality, and are themselves subject to market colonization.
The theory describes the rescaling of federal authority to local centers of political
power. Criminal justice policy activism by local governments is punishment
entrepreneurship: an accumulative approach to securing fiscal gain, political hegemony,
security, and capitalized power. Local immigration enforcement entrepreneurship
targets unauthorized and other deportable immigrants. This punitive immigration
control reinforces racially structured social relations by obscuring the diminishing
returns neoliberal globalization provides working class whites.
Keywor ds
Deportation, detention, immigration, local governance, neoliberalism, political
economy, punishment
The well-documented extremes of recent US immigration enforcement give the
impression of a sui generis phenomenon, born as the Trump administration has married
nativist rhetoric and authoritarian politics to what is arguably the most overtly
Cor r esponding aut hor :
Daniel L Stageman, Sociology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 524 W est 59th St Rm 601B, New York,
10019–1093, USA.
Email: dstageman@jjay.cuny.edu

2

Theoretical Criminology

neoliberal policy approach in late modern history. Understanding this apparent shift
requires viewing it as a continuity rather than an interruption, the logical next step in
the neoliberal project defined by David Harvey as ‘in the first instance a [set] of
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills’, wherein ‘[t]he [sole] role
of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such
practices’ (Harvey, 2007: 2). An understanding of punitive practices as the exercise of
state power might suggest that it is the authoritarian impulse that has recently pushed
state-mandated punishments to overstep this more limited role. However, Harvey’s
third and final defining tenet states that ‘if markets do not exist (in areas such as land,
water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they
must be created, by state action if necessary’ (Harvey, 2007: 2). Harvey’s parenthetical
list omits what Beckett and Murakawa (2012) have referred to as ‘the shadow carceral
state’, a broad array of punitive structures and practices that includes civil immigration
enforcement. The current administration appears to have recognized overtly the extent
to which the structures of immigration control can be placed in the service of a
punishment marketplace. The most dramatic examples of this recognition shaping
policy include the speed with which the Trump administration reversed Obama-era
attempts to end the federal Bureau of Prisons’ contracts with for-profit corrections
corporations—and the even swifter recovery of these corporations’ share prices upon
the news of Trump’s election (Lurie, 2016; Sessions, 2017).
The punishment marketplace is a theory intended to explain the dynamics of
contemporary systems of punishment that are both integral to the operation of the
neoliberal political economy and internally subject to the market logics that define it.
Prior to the current administration, federal policy inertia—and the resultant
weakening of federal authority—empowered political-economic elites at the state and
local levels1 to approach policy innovation as entrepreneurship: a project of benefit
accumulation intended to concentrate fiscal profit, sociopolitical hegemony, security,
and cultural dominance in private hands. The US political economy of punishment
appears no longer to serve the narrow function theorized by Rusche and Kirchheimer
(2003 [1939]) as a tool for disciplining low-paid workers and deterring behaviors
likely to reduce the value of their labor. This is now only one of many possible
functions, in service of a political-economic elite limited only by their
entrepreneurial acumen in the extraction of benefit through punitive policy
innovation. Fiscal profit is one such benefit, and its pursuit provides the capitalist
logic by which the marketplace operates (Clifford and Silver-Greenberg, 2014;
Shelden and Brown, 2000; Trujillo-Pagan, 2014).
I propose the punishment marketplace as a successor to Rusche and Kirchheimer’s
political economy of punishment, refined through the lens of Bernard Harcourt’s
neoliberal penality: if ‘[e]very system of production tends to discover punishments
which correspond to its productive relationships’ (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 2003
[1939]: 5), then late modern neoliberal systems of production require distinctly
neoliberal systems of punishment. The punishment marketplace is neoliberalism turned
back upon itself, with market economics colonizing the authoritarian structures and
systems of power that make it possible and define its limits. As a market-place, it
reflects the rescaling of the contemporary neoliberal project, away from the nation-
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state, and the recentering of power to global and local levels. Recognizing
neoliberalism as the governing framework for an accumulative project of inequality
requires the further recognition that this accumulation is not simply a fiscal pursuit, but
a political-economic one, in which elites compete for a range of capitals: economic and
political, social and cultural, security and hegemony alike. Here I take Bichler and
Nitzan’s (2014: 252) suggestion that scholars ‘discard the politics/economics duality
and instead think of capital as power and capitalism as a mode of power’. Practices of
punishment allow a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of ‘capitalized power’, a
flexibility that is characteristic of neoliberal policy entrepreneurship.
In the sections that follow, I will propose an understanding of contemporary US
immigration control rooted not in the extremes of the Trump era, but in the increasingly
localized approaches of states, counties, and municipalities enabled by the policies of
the preceding Obama and Bush administrations. While this article is concerned chiefly
with the specifics of US immigration control, the theory that it proposes—of a
distinctly neoliberal system of punitive immigration control in turn reinscribed with
market-driven, neoliberal structures of entrepreneurial accumulation—has clear
parallels and applications in the approaches of other nations, Australia and the UK
arguably chief among them (see, for example, Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Welch, 2014;
Welch and Schuster, 2005. To establish the unique context that has allowed the US
punishment marketplace (and immigration enforcement entrepreneurship within it) to
thrive, I discuss the neoliberal colonization of the language of public goods (or
benefits), the intersection of neoliberalism with US neoconservatism and its
authoritarian outcomes, and the expanding conceptual and practical relationships
between neoliberal punitiveness through criminal justice practices and immigration
control. Finally, I identify the structural and technological shifts in a global political
economy that have allowed punitive immigration control to be deployed as a key
mediator in the late modern capital/labor dialectic. In order to dramatize the
entrepreneurial nature of locally devolved immigration enforcement, I sketch brief
parallel case studies of state-level ‘immigration enforcement marketplaces’ in the US
states of Georgia and New Jersey, respectively. These states developed distinct, locally
driven enforcement entrepreneurship largely under the federal auspices of the
comparatively technocratic Obama administration, to devastating effect for the targeted
individuals and communities.

A dvancing t he neoliber al pr oject of inequalit y: Language,
cult ur e, and aut hor it y
Neoliberal ideology sets the cultural, political, and policy framework that makes the
contemporary US detention and deportation system possible. It positions the goal of
capital accumulation as a primary, intrinsic good. As an ideology, it allows for
deliberately obscuring language use and terminology. Sayer (2014:[ A Q 1] ) identifies
the neoliberal tendency to use the term ‘investment’ in a manner that ‘allows people to
mistake wealth extraction for wealth creation’:
This indifference as to whether individuals or institutions are funding genuine investment or
merely vehicles for providing money for the ‘investor’ is a major irrationality of capitalism,
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and the way we use the word ‘investment’ helps to conceal it. […] While you might get a
return on a genuine investment, you might not […] but it could still be an investment in the
first sense if it brings benefits to someone.

Sayer’s observation on the (deliberately) obscuring nature of neoliberal language use
raises important questions about the framing of government-provided services as public
goods (or ‘benefits’). If federal immigration control represents a public good, who is
intended to benefit from its provision, and how are they intended to benefit?2 In the
language of utilitarianism, ‘[a]n action [of government] may be said to conform to the
principle of utility when its tendency to increase the happiness of the community is
greater than any tendency it has to lessen it’ (Bentham, 2010 [1823]: 7). The USA’s
punitive approach to immigration control can be understood as neoliberal rent-seeking
obscured by the language of public benefit. This deliberate obscuring of the definition
of benefit—concealing rent-seeking within the conceptual framework of good
governance—is a cultural phenomenon as much as it is political obfuscation.
Immigration control is understood as a public good by a significant proportion of the
US populace, making it particularly vulnerable to private rent-seeking.
One of the primary conceits of ‘free market’ ideology is that the wealth generated by
market competition is widely distributed. Not re-distributed, as redistribution is a
hallmark of Keynesian progressive tax policy, but rather permeating every level of
society through the ‘trickle-down’ effect ostensibly associated with supply-side
economics. This is a simplified version of Francis Fukuyama’s thesis in his seminal
1992 essay The End of History and The Last Man, where he claims that, due to
globalization, ‘liberal principles in economics—the “free market”—have spread, and
have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity’ (Fukuyama,
2006 [1992]: xiii), in both developed and ‘Third World’ countries. Through access to
global markets, Fukuyama (2006 [1992]: 77) contends, ever-increasing specialization
made possible by economies of scale leads to ‘rational organization of labor, dictat[ing]
certain consistent, large-scale changes in social structure’: among them urbanization,
increasing mobility, and the breakdown of traditional or ‘tribal’ social structures.
It is arguable from a late modern perspective that Fukuyama’s predictions have not
aged well. Contemporary urbanization is dogged by residential segregation and
gentrification; increased mobility manifests in stateless populations scattered around
the globe; and tribalism has retrenched, driving pronounced rightward shifts in US and
European politics. The outcomes Fukuyama predicted have been enjoyed as positive
fruits of neoliberalism almost exclusively by a narrow global economic elite—an
indication that, in order to create wealth, neoliberalism must simultaneously create
poverty:
This kind of poverty does not relate to a lack of ‘development’ and is not the symptom of a
‘backwardness’ that economic growth would reduce. Instead it is one which is created anew
by dispositifs of segmentation, division and differentiation within a society which is
‘objectively’ wealthy. Neoliberal poverty is quite different in form from that suffered by
people in countries which are ‘materially poor’ since it arises from a political will.
(Lazzarato, 2009: 128, emphasis added)
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The competitive dynamic of the ‘free market’ requires ‘losers’ as well as ‘winners’ to
justify its existence. More than simply a symbolic or ideological conceit, this
arrangement is a practical effect of neoliberalism’s accumulative purpose. To facilitate
continually increasing capital accumulation by political-economic elites, neoliberal
policy needs to engineer a concomitant decrease in the wealth and political power of
labor. While not a zero-sum game—the ‘equal and opposite’ gain and loss implied by a
closed system—wealth is not ‘created’ but given and taken in systemic exchange.
Neoliberalism, then, is a project of inequality, facilitated by cultural and social
relations as much as by politics and policy-making. US neoliberalism finds its cultural
expression in the seemingly incompatible ideological construct of movement
conservatism. US conservatism stands for more than simply the revanchist return to
traditional mores and social arrangements. It is most importantly the manifestation of
neoliberal economic ideology in personal codes and individual world-views:
[N]eoliberalism is not confined to an expressly economic sphere, nor does it cast the market
as natural and self-regulating even in the economic sphere. Part of what makes neoliberalism
‘neo’ is that it depicts free markets, free trade, and entrepreneurial rationality as achieved and
normative, […] a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational economic
actors in every sphere of life.
(Brown, 2006: 694[ A Q2]

This political culture casts ‘citizens as individual entrepreneurs […] whose moral
autonomy is measured by their capacity for “self-care”—their ability to provide for
their own needs and service their own ambitions’ (Brown, 2006: 694), tying
accumulative success in the neoliberal free market to a kind of moral superiority.
Thus, in the (neoliberal) moral calculus of conservatism, individual circumstances
result from entrepreneurial successes or failures in navigating the market, rather than
systemic problems or structural inequities. The conservative stance on welfare and
other government benefits is a manifestation of this calculus: the state should not
interfere with the market to ‘reward failure’, but rather let the dynamics of the market
itself reward virtue, as it is designed to. This aversion to state benefits, however, is not
generally an expression of a commitment to logically consistent, libertarian ideas about
the appropriate limits of state power. On the contrary, contemporary US conservatism
has shown itself to favor an authoritarian state—most recently in the ascendance of
Donald Trump to the nation’s presidency. Trump’s apparent electoral populism—
jettisoned dramatically upon taking office—has been read incorrectly by some pundits
(see, for example, Jacobin, 2017; Leopold, 2017) as a repudiation of neoliberalism; in
fact, it is a clear example of what Ian Bruff (2014: 121) describes as ‘authoritarian
neoliberalism’, where the ‘solution [to the manifest failures of capitalism to engender
broad prosperity] entails not the fundamental reform or the overturning of capitalism
but the demand for “increased ethical responsibility by individuals”’. This
interpretation is consistent with Bernard Harcourt’s (2010) notion of neoliberal
penality, in that, under the populist logic of authoritarian US neoconservatism, any
violation of the rules of exchange that define the free market—that is, through
criminality—should be punished swiftly and severely through state exercise of coercive
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force. Since ‘illegal immigrant’ status is an expression of criminality in the tautological
rationale of nativism, neoliberal conservatism holds that the state is obligated to punish
unauthorized immigrants as criminals. Thus nativism, discussed by scholars such as
Varsanyi (2011) as a site of ideological resistance to a globalist neoliberalism that
encourages immigration, is in fact an expression of its cultural logic. Globalist
neoliberalism encourages labor migration—but relies on popular nativism to further its
project of inequality, by ensuring that immigrant labor is consistently disadvantaged in
its interactions with capital.

N eoliber alism and cont em por ar y pat t er ns of im m igr at ion
In addition to setting the broad economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for the
operation of the punishment marketplace, neoliberalism has also played a specific role in
developing contemporary patterns of immigration to the USA. The North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 is a clear example of neoliberal international trade
policy, in the service of a globalized economy and the free movement of capital across
international borders: ‘giv[ing] free rein to private investments in the market, while keeping
the bearers of labor power—workers—rooted in their national states’ (Otero, 2011: 387).
NAFTA ended protective tariffs for staple crops in Mexico, contributing to the collapse of
Mexico’s agricultural economy and plunging millions of Mexican farmers and their
families into food insecurity (Nevins, 2007).
NAFTA’s effects contributed to a broader dynamic, driven by demographic realities,
of immigration from the developing nations of the global South to the established
economies of the global North. Aging populations and relatively low birth rates in
wealthy countries simultaneously produce large numbers of low-wage jobs and a
shrinking native-born labor pool to fill them (Castles et al., 2013; Massey et al., 2003).
Because neoliberal ideology dictates diametrically opposed experiences of
globalization for capital and labor, with the former empowered to cross national
borders with increasing ease and the latter increasingly restricted from doing so, lowwage labor migrants commonly pursue these opportunities without official government
authorization. As a result, they experience what Saskia Sassen (2014: 29, emphasis in
original) describes as ‘expulsions—from life projects and livelihoods, from
membership, from the social contract at the center of liberal democracy’. Expelled
from their home countries by the globalized pursuit of profit within a neoliberal
agenda, they are similarly ‘expelled’ or excluded from meaningful social membership
in their destination country, where low-wage labor fails to earn them the mutual
obligation implied by the social contract.
The cultural and policy dynamics that enable this exclusion have been described by
Juliet Stumpf (2006: 396–397) as crimmigration, a description of the increasing
overlap between criminal and immigration law and their respective systems and
functions: ‘[b]oth systems act as gatekeepers of membership in our society,
determining whether an individual should be included or excluded’. Robert Koulish
(2010: 56) identifies neoliberalism as a specific driver of crimmigration:
A grand irony of neoliberal democracy is that the minimal state, its hallmark, gains legitimacy
by becoming an almost pervasive presence in people’s lives. […] [A]lthough market ideology
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suggests the market is society’s most efficient regulator, the market draws immigrants into the
country and is much less effective at excluding them once they have arrived.

While Koulish appears to conflate immigrant labor participation with social inclusion,
the genius of contemporary US neoliberalism is its ability to separate and oppose
economic inclusion from social exclusion, in a process Jock Young described as ‘social
bulimia’ (Brotherton and Naegler, 2014; Young, 1999). The combination of the
culturally situated nativism of US conservatives and the punitive policy agenda of the
authoritarian state they support makes this dichotomy possible. Similar to Kitty
Calavita’s (2005) concept of ‘subordinated inclusion’, Young’s ‘social bulimia’ is
functionally distinct in its reliance on the ever-present threat of physical removal
through deportation and detention—existential conditions described as deportability
and detainability by scholars such as De Genova (2016) and Leyro (2013, 2017).

N eoliber al punishm ent : T he evolut ion of inst r um ent alist
penalit y
Neoliberal approaches to criminal justice system punishment provide the template for
the USA’s current punitive approach to immigration control. Bernard Harcourt (2010:
7, emphases in original) asserts that:
The key to understanding our contemporary punishment practices […] turns on the
emergence in the 18th century of the idea of natural order and the eventual metamorphosis of
this idea, over the course of the 20th century, into the concept of market efficiency.

Harcourt positions criminal justice system punishment as an essential feature of postindustrial political economy, the consequential end of a legal system designed ‘to
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange—the
“market”, explicit or implicit’ (Posner, 1985: 1195). This furthers the argument put
forth by Sayer (2014) about the obscuring nature of the neoliberal approach to
language: the overwhelmingly restrictive penal regime of mass incarceration as
necessary to facilitate the ‘freedom’ of market exchange. Recognizing the paradox,
Harcourt (2011a) responds to the argument that the neoliberal logic of market
efficiency militates against the bureaucratic bloat of contemporary mass incarceration:
[M]ass incarceration during this period of post-industrial economic depression, with real
unemployment around 17.7% and nothing but a service economy left, can relatively easily be
justified on a cost–benefit basis. It all depends on what value we place on intangibles like
liberty, coercion, human capital, human misery, being unemployed, prison economies, the
cost of crime, etc. […] Within [the] political economy [of mass incarceration], cost–benefit
analysis involves complex political decisions, not neutral costing or accounting principles.

Despite neoliberalism’s ideological adherence to market (i.e. fiscal or economic)
efficiency, its real-world application is dependent upon the political economic context
in which it is applied. Mass incarceration is essential to the provision of an institutional
framework appropriate to the practice of free market economics in as many policy
spheres as possible. As such, it is appropriate to neoliberal governance, despite
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restricting individual freedom by its very design. The concept of individual freedom
prized under this framework excludes the freedom to circumvent market exchange
through criminal activity.
Despite the fact that ‘the free market, governed by “natural order,” is insulated from
punishment’, the converse is not the case. Rather, ‘[t]he punishment field […] is wide
open not only to government intervention, but to profit and economics as well’
(Harcourt, 2011b: 237); private/for-profit prisons and prison labor support this claim.
Many of the same corporations active in the private/for-profit prison industry expanded
heavily into immigrant detention in the early 21st century, enhancing their profitability
and extending the logic of crimmigration into every aspect of the systems’ parallel
conditions of confinement. Contemporary US immigration control, like mass
incarceration, is both subject to the free market logic of neoliberal ideology and an
artifact of its contemporary political economic context. It also restricts individual
freedom in order to define the edges of the acceptable in free market exchange.

T he polit ical econom y of punishm ent
From a penological perspective, the structural purpose of contemporary US
immigration control can best be understood through the lens of Rusche and
Kirchheimer’s political economy of punishment. The theory’s premise, as outlined
above, received comparatively little attention until its extensive treatment in Michel
Foucault’s (1977) Discipline and Punish. Foucault argued that: ‘[contemporary]
systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain ‘political economy’ of the body:
[…] its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission’. In
Foucault’s (1977: 25–26) reading, the disciplined body is a productive body, whose
‘constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of
subjection’. The most effective systems of discipline are imprinted on the mind,
internalized by their object. The imprint of ‘illegal’ status is just such a system,
carrying with it the constant threat of deportation in consequence for any deviation
from productive labor. The contemporary undocumented US immigrant bears her
illegality through the physical displays of race, ethnicity, and culture, a complementary
system of external and internal markings that subjects her actions to the invisible
discipline of the ‘market.’ In practical terms this means that both she and anyone with
whom she may be interacting understand that, should she attempt to assert an
alternative identity (such as community member, parent, resident, or otherwise rightsbearing human subject), she risks being punished by deportation.
The internalized concept of illegality supports the contemporary neoliberal project
of inequality by instrumentalizing immigrant labor. Dario Melossi’s interpretation of
the political economy of punishment supports Foucault’s in arguing that early modern
incarceration constituted ‘disciplinary training for capitalist production’ (Melossi and
Pavarini, 1981: 21). With the industrial era ‘capitalist production’ of Fordist valueadded manufacturing replaced by neoliberal rent-seeking, the contemporary US context
requires different disciplines for different populations. For a low-wage labor force of
unauthorized and undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants, the
‘disciplinary training’ implied by illegality, detention, and deportation is one of
instability, servility, and exclusion. Undocumented laborers are, in effect, being trained
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to accept the suspension of the traditional social contract, to internalize illegality and
the status of the permanent ‘other’ that accompanies it.
This reading incorporates the ideas of the Russian legal scholar EB Pashukanis, who
contended that, in addition to ‘its uses as a repressive instrument of class domination,
[punishment] also operates as an ideological apparatus, helping to reproduce the mental
and cultural categories on which capitalist rule depends’ (Garland, 1991: 131). Such
categories are essential to the organization of productive relationships. As Ruth Wilson
Gilmore (2007: 32) illustrates in Golden Gulag, her seminal work on California’s
neoliberal prison-building boom:
[D]ominant Anglos organized labor and propertied classes according to Black–white,
European–non-European, and Protestant–Catholic hierarchies […]. Through legislative edicts
and institutional practices, state, capital, and labor power blocs manipulated the unique
characteristics of the population to designate […] members, servants, and enemies [...]

Illegality, as a successor and supplement to racial, ethnic, and national categories, is
commonly conceived as a legal status; it is most importantly a cultural one. Created by
the socially bulimic pattern of invitation and expulsion established with the historical
pairing of the Bracero Program and Operation Wetback (Calavita, 1992; Kanstroom,
2007), ‘a person obtains [the] status [of illegal immigrant] by falling outside of the
affirmatively defined categories of membership, in other words, by the absence of legal
status’ (Varsanyi, 2011: 305–306, emphasis in original). The cultural category implied
by ‘illegal immigrant/alien’ is one of legal non-personhood, reproduced in the
dominant culture, and reinterpreted as a mental category in the psychology of the
undocumented immigrants who are its object, through the constant threat of punitive
immigration control.
Gilmore (2007: 55) characterizes the overlapping systems of punitive incarceration
and immigration control as systemic responses to a crisis of surplus, brought on by the
transition from the economic paradigm of Keynesian full employment, to the postindustrial, Friedmanian paradigm of sustained ‘natural’ unemployment: ‘implicit in
capital’s imperative to accumulate is an equal necessity to disaccumulate. Systemic
failure to disaccumulate constitutes crisis.’ The ‘surplus’ is in this case the population
of disengaged and discarded laborers who need to be ‘contained, if not deported […] to
prison or abroad’, allowing employers to ‘exploit actual and implied undocumented
workers’ political powerlessness’ (Gilmore, 2007: 77). In this sense, the practice of
punishment can be understood as a political rationality of neoliberal government, ‘not
“government” as an institution […] but as the activity that consists in governing
people’s conduct within the framework of, and using the instruments of, a state’
(Dardot and Laval, 2013 [2009]: 5).
In addition to its role facilitating labor exploitation, detention presents unique
opportunities for ‘rent-seeking’, not only among private/for-profit prison providers, but
also for a host of secondary service providers and subcontractors (Trujillo-Pagan, 2014).
Private/for-profit prison providers like the former Corrections Corporation of
America3 have increasingly relied on the income associated with immigrant detention
to maintain profitability in the face of declining occupancy rates in their state and
federal contracts for regular criminal justice system incarceration. With the average
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daily cost of detaining an individual immigrant estimated at $159 (National
Immigration Forum, 2013)—more than three times the concurrent average contracted
amount for state prisoners—the strategy has been highly successful, allowing CCA to
maintain or increase its operating margins in the face of falling occupancy rates (see
Table 1) (Corrections Corporation of America, 2013).

Rescaling im m igr at ion cont r ol: Punishm ent , pr ofit , and public–
pr ivat e par t ner ships t hr ough local policy ent r epr eneur ship
‘[T]he decentralization, diffusion, and pluralization of enforcement’ (Walsh, 2014: 241) has
manifested in immigration control as increasing localization since the 1996 passage of
IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (US House
of Representatives, 1996)). This rescaling has occurred in the context of the broader
devolution of federal authority (as an aspect of the ‘rollout neoliberalism’ of the 1980s and
1990s) to states and localities (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Gilmore (2007: 81) points to
‘declines of 12.5 percent (state) to 60 percent (local) in revenues derived from federal aid’
in California during this period as evidence of a general deligitimation of the Keynesian
state. In Varsanyi’s (2011: 297) reading, ‘the transition from the [Fordist] Keynesian
welfare state to the neoliberalizing state […] has […] decentered the nation-state as the preeminent sociopolitical container in the contemporary political economy’, allowing state,
county, and municipal governments to take on ‘policy entrepreneurship’ in spheres
previously the sole purview of a strong federal government. Gilmore (2007: 78) suggests
that newly empowered state and local governments have to balance the needs of local
capital interests against a more narrow voting public: ‘[i]nsofar as the capitalist state must
both help capital be profitable, and keep the formal inequality of capitalism acceptable to
the polity […], it develops fiscal, institutional, and ideological means to carry out these
tasks’. Thus nativist immigration policy activism through locally controlled immigration
enforcement and the passage of restrictive local ordinances serves the bulimic process of
labor inclusion/social exclusion. Rather than focusing on unauthorized immigrants as
laborers (the role in which they benefit capital), many restrictive local ordinances focus on
circumscribing immigrants’ rights as community members.4 Cultural expressions of
nativism by working class white voters may be intended to contest the perceived effects of
globalization, but when translated into government action are subverted into a form that
ultimately supports neoliberalism’s economic goals.

T he polit ical econom y of cont em por ar y punishm ent
The theories of the punishment marketplace and punishment entrepreneurship take into
account four characteristic features of contemporary economic relations that set the 21stcentury neoliberal order apart from the 20th-century Fordist industrialism that preceded it:
(1) the increasing abstraction, due primarily to technological advances, of the
nature of labor on the one hand, and capital investment on the other;
(2) the growing dislocation between laborer and consumer roles in contemporary
economic relationships, and the increasing relative importance of consumer
behavior;
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(3) the clientization of worker/consumers in their relationships with corporate
capital, as an aspect of the transition from an industrial to a service-based
economy;
(4) the marketization by capital interests of diverse spheres of human interaction,
from the political and social spheres to cultural and legal ones, and the
increasing application of entrepreneurial objectives to human interactions not
formerly subject to market logic.
Each of these individual features has some bearing on contemporary modes of
punishment. The central theme of Rusche’s theory is that criminal justice system
punishment (specifically in the form of incarceration) functions as a deterrent—not to
the commission of future crimes, but to the attempts of those individuals who form ‘the
lowest strata of the laboring classes’ (Melossi, 2003: xi) to improve their situation—
that is, to achieve some advantage in their interactions with capital5 through recourse to
the underground economy (to circumvent the rules of free market exchange, per
Harcourt), through labor organizing, or any other activity that: (1) disrupts their ready
availability as a cheap and flexible labor force; or (2) represents an attempt to
circumvent free market exchange.
In the globalized, technologized, neoliberal service economy, however, the value of
punishment as a form of labor force discipline becomes diffuse. How should this
disciplinary effect function in a paradigm lacking obvious ‘legitimate’ labor force roles
for the lowest socioeconomic strata? Its multiple functions are in fact defined by the
four changes in contemporary economic relations outlined above, of which the most
important to the context of punitive immigration control is clientization. The others
serve to make this clientization profitable: the abstraction of capital investment is a
major contributor to the privatization that makes entrepreneurial approaches to
immigration control possible, as described by Saskia Sassen (2014: 9):
What is new and characteristic of our current era is the capacity of finance to develop
enormously complex instruments that allow it to securitize the broadest-ever, historically
speaking, range of entities and processes[.] While traditional banking is about selling money
that the bank has, finance is about selling something it does not have. To do this, finance
needs to invade—that is, securitize—nonfinancial sectors to get the grist for its mill.

Abstracted capital investments, in other words, are at the root of the contemporary
neoliberal economy’s movement toward marketization. In order to sell ‘financial
products’ that they do not concretely possess, financial institutions must actively apply
market logics and principles to sectors that operated previously on the basis of other
principles. Examples such as the mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the 2007
financial meltdown relied on the manipulation of consumer behaviors, through
political, social, and cultural means. Low-income mortgage buyers were saddled with
massive amounts of debt that—with no realistic expectation of ever being fully
repaid—was then repackaged and sold at a value that was largely illusory, if not
straightforwardly fraudulent.6 Punishment serves a multiplicity of functions in this
context, holding the potential to condition value-generating behaviors across a range of
life domains, rather than simply in the arena of labor.
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T able 1. Total incarceration per 100k adults vs Corrections Corporation of America
occupancy and operating margins, 2007–2012.[ A Q 3]
2007
2008
Total incarceration per 1000 (**) 1000 (0%)
100k adults (%change
from previous year)
CCA occupancy (%
98.2%(**) 95.5%(–2.7%)
change from previous
year)
CCA operating
34.2%(**) 35.1%(+.9%)
margin (% change
from previous year)

2009
980 (–2%)

2010
960 (–2%)

90.6%(–4.9%) 90.2%(–.4%)

2011
940 (–2%)

2012
920 (–2%)

89.9%(–.3%)

88.2%(–1.7%)

30.6%(–4.5%) 30.6%(+/–0%) 34.3%(+3.7%) 36.3%(+2%)

Clientization is a term originally coined by Clifford Geertz to describe the basic
relationship between buyer and seller that defines the contemporary service economy—
‘the tendency for repetitive purchasers of particular goods and services to establish
continuing relationships with particular purveyors of them, rather than search widely
through the market at each occasion of need’ (Geertz, 1978: 30). In the contemporary
context, factors such as contractual provisions and monopolies tend to empower the
provider over the consumer in these exchanges. The term can also characterize the
parallel relationship between the institutionalized and the ‘total institutions’ that
confine them (Goffman, 2007 [1961]). Here the state is the consumer, the ‘client’ its
ward, and the institution provides the ‘service’ of confinement.
In clientized sectors, the ‘free market’ negotiation over the value of a good or service
is mediated by a contractually defined relationship, in which value may be legally
established on the basis of incidental client characteristics—from the risk classification of
a prisoner, to the unauthorized or ‘illegal’ status of a detained immigrant, to the ‘preexisting conditions’ of a patient. In many sectors that rely on this model, particularly
when payment is supplied by a third party (government, in most cases), profit is
dependent on the cost difference between the services contracted and the services actually
provided. Labor costs in these sectors may be secondary to the characteristics of
individual clients upon which contracted pricing structures depend. The relationships that
give rise to third party/government contracts for various kinds of client services are
dependent upon marketization and predominate in such marketized government sectors as
benefit distribution and health care (particularly Medicaid and Medicare).
Late modern incarceration is another clientized market, with prisoners in the client
role and private prisons providing the service—often with subcontractors providing
secondary services such as health care, food services, and so on. Contemporary US
punishment uses state coercion to force individuals with a limited value as laborers into
the position of prisoner-clients (or probationer-clients, parolee-clients, etc.). Profit is
dependent upon ‘selling’ the maximum public benefit (i.e. of incapacitation,
rehabilitation, or removal) to the government payer while minimizing the actual
provision of services. The higher costs for civil detention of immigrants are ostensibly
dependent upon the additional human rights claims of unconvicted detainees; with no
enforcement mechanism sufficient to ensure these claims are translated into actual
services, detention providers convert these claims directly into profits ( Homeland
Security Advisory Council, 2016; Office of the Inspector General, US Department of
Justice, 2016; Schriro, 2013).
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T able 2. Variable values and factor ranks for the states of Georgia and New Jersey, 2008–
2012.
Variable

Market scale (factor rank)
Total population of unauthorized
immigrants (in thousands)
Non-citizens as a proportion of
total population
Unauthorized immigrants as a
proportion of total labor force

Econ Anxiety (factor rank)
Proportion of labor force
unemployed
Proportion of unauth population
not participating in labor force

AVG

AVG

AVG

AVG

AVG

COT

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2008–2012

GA NJ

GA NJ GA

GA NJ

GA NJ

GA

NJ

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
475 550 425 450 425 550 432 526 400 525 –75

NJ
3
–25

.062 .099 .061 .101 .064 .102 .063 .102 .062 .103 –.000 +.004
.063 .092 .069 .085 .070 .086 .072 .096 .056 .082 –.007 –.010
4
2
4
2
5
3
5
2
5
3
4
4
.064 .054 .098 .091 .107 .093 .101 .094 .091 .095 +.027 +.041
.32

.23

.29

Punitiveness (factor rank)

5
2
5
Incarceration rate per 100,000
542 305 533
population
Number of prisoners held in
5146 2682 5129
private facilities
Proportion of total legislative seats .593 .408 .589
held by Republicans
Local enforcement entrepreneurship 5
4
5

.22

.24

.27

.29

.24

.31

.24

–.01

2
5
2
5
1
5
1
2
297 560 284 547 270 542 261 0

+.01
2
–44

2950 5233 2841 5615 2887 7900 2717 +2285 +35
.408 .589 .417 .631 .408 .640 .383 +.047 –.025
4

5

4

5

4

5

5

5

5

(rank)
Average daily population of
detained immigrants
Total number of 287(g)
memoranda of understanding
Proportion of jurisdictions with
active Secure Communities
MOA[ A Q 4]

1822 1147 1975 1232 2044 1370 2376 1629 2414 2000 +592 +853
4

1

5

2

5

3

5

3

.00

.00

.02

.00

.06

.00

1.00 .00

5

3

+1

+2

1.00 1.00 +1.00 +1.00

Operat ionalizing t he punit ive im migrat ion cont rol m arket place:
Localized immigrat ion enforcem ent in Georgia and New Jersey,
2008–2012
The workings of the punishment marketplace and punitive immigration control
encompass broad and overlapping sociocultural and political-economic practices,
policies, and attitudes. In an attempt to rectify what Coleman and Stuesse (2016: 524)
call the ‘disconnect between […] theories of power and the actually existing bodies and
spaces that these theories are said to represent’, I present two brief case studies of
punitive immigration control marketplaces, in the culturally, historically, and
geographically distinct states of Georgia and New Jersey. I present first a suite of
quantitative statistics for each state (Table 2), drawn from a larger empirical analysis
undertaken in 2017; these statistics, in brief, show the two states’ pentile rankings on
local enforcement and factors of market scale, punitiveness, and economic anxiety for
the years 2008–2012, along with the constituent variables from which these factors
were calculated. Both states, despite their disparate histories, cultures, and geographies,
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show high-volume and growing local immigration enforcement marketplaces
(generally ranking 4 or 5 out of 5 on this factor in measures of both annual averages,
and increase over time). Using sources from investigative journalism and advocacy
group reports, I attempt to illustrate how enforcement entrepreneurship in the states
developed over the five-year period under examination, and show how these
enforcement marketplaces are shaped by local policy-making, lobbying, administrative
decisions, and other actions undertaken in the entrepreneurial pursuit of benefit.
Both a ‘new destination’ state for 21st-century unauthorized immigrants and one of
the anchors of the conservative Southern ‘Bible Belt’, Georgia’s state government has
closely followed the neoliberal economic blueprint of widespread privatization,
reduced public services, and corporate subsidies; its current Governor, Nathan Deal,
‘has emphasized time and again that he believes it is the role of government to get out
of the way and let the private sector stimulate the economy’ (Semuels, 2015).
This approach has required high incarceration rates to condition Georgia’s lowincome population to consistently high unemployment, minimal benefits, and low
wages. Georgia began privatizing its correctional system in 1997, contracting with the
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) for the construction and operation of three
for-profit prisons. An additional contract with the GEO Group brought a 1500-bed
privately owned and operated facility online in late 2011. Together, these facilities held
roughly 8000 prisoners by the end of 2012, about 14 percent of the state’s total
incarcerated population. CCA reports that its two Georgia facilities are among its most
profitable, along with a detailed description of how it ensured this profitability:
In December 2009, CCA also entered into an Economic Development Agreement with […]
Coffee County, Georgia to implement a tax abatement plan related to CCA’s bed expansion
project at its Coffee Correctional Facility […] for 100% abatement of real property taxes for
five years. Under the plan, legal title of CCA’s real property was transferred to Coffee
County. In December 2009, Coffee County issued bonds in a maximum principal amount of
$33.0 million. The bonds were issued to CCA, so no cash exchanged hands. Coffee County
then leased the real property back to CCA. The lease payments are equal to the amount of the
payments on the bonds. At any time, CCA has the option to purchase the real property by
paying off the bonds, plus $100.
(Corrections Corporation of America, 2013)

CCA not only arranged to pay zero property taxes on its Coffee County facility for five
full years, but also arranged to receive a $33 million loan, in the form of a Coffee
County bond issuance, to expand the facility. The County secured the loan, and CCA
paid only the interest on the bonds, meaning Coffee County receives no tax or rent
revenues for the facility that it legally owns.
The development of immigrant detention in Georgia has followed similar patterns
and involved many of the same corporate players. CCA owned and operated two of the
four major detention centers active in Georgia as of 2012; the third private/for-profit
facility is the Irwin County Detention Center, which came online roughly in the middle
of this study’s data window (December 2010), accounting for much of the increase in
Georgia’s detainee population from 2010 to 2012. Its corporate owner and manager,
Detention Management, LLC, and the process that led to its contract with ICE,7 were
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the subject of a 2012 investigation by The Nation (Rappleye and Riordan Seville,
2012). The investigation found that its five principals all had long and checkered
histories in both the private/for-profit and public corrections fields, but sufficient
influence to lobby two of Georgia’s influential elected officials to pressure ICE to
provide detainees to fill the Irwin facility. In response, ICE officials wrote that ‘“[w]e
can move a hundred women out of Etowah [detention facility in Etowah County,
Alabama], and replace them with a hundred others. […] Not a zero-sum issue.” […]
ICE would simply find more “bodies” to fill the beds’ (Rappleye and Riordan Seville,
2012). ICE was supported in this endeavor by local Georgia officials through the
287(g) and Secure Communities8 immigration enforcement programs. According to the
ACLU’s 2012 report Prisoners of profit,[ A Q 5] ‘[t]he majority of immigrant detainees
[…] were detained after being stopped for traffic violations throughout Georgia’,
echoing the findings of Coleman and Stuesse (2016: 535), whose ‘data showed that a
number of agencies—especially those identified by immigrant rights groups as tough
on undocumented communities—were heavily involved in the use of driver’s license
roadblocks’.
The political-economic benefit for elected sheriffs engaging in federal–local
enforcement partnerships is also on display in New Jersey, where immigration has
remained a consistent social reality for centuries. After the 1965 Immigration Act,
immigration to New Jersey diversified, such that large contemporary communities of
Dominicans, Cubans, Haitians, Koreans, South Americans, South Asians, Chinese, and
other ethnic groups define the character of neighborhoods and towns across the state
(Shaw, 1994). Nativism, however, has remained a significant force in state politics and
culture: a 2009 Monmouth University poll—a year when non-citizens made up over a
tenth of the state’s population, and unauthorized immigrants close to a tenth (8.5
percent) of the state’s workforce—over half of the respondents characterized ‘illegal
immigration’ as a ‘very serious’ problem, and some 62 percent opposed granting
‘illegal immigrants’ the right to hold even a ‘limited’ driver’s license (Monmouth
University/Gannett New Jersey Poll, 2009). Nativism arguably played a role in the
election of Monmouth County Sheriff Kim Guadagno—a former federal prosecutor—
who in 2009 fulfilled a campaign promise to enter the county into a 287(g) agreement
with ICE.
In addition to the apparent electoral benefit to Sheriff Guadagno, Monmouth
County’s 287(g) agreement provided direct fiscal benefit through the Monmouth
County Jail’s detention agreement with ICE: in 2009, it held an average daily
population of 150 immigrant detainees. In 2010—after Guadagno’s implementation of
287(g)—this number jumped by 100, reaching 280 by 2012. Guadagno’s history and
connections as a federal prosecutor—as with the principals of Irwin County’s
Detention Management—provided a competitive edge to Monmouth County’s
immigration enforcement entrepreneurship, and allowed the Sheriff to stack both
political benefits and direct fiscal benefits through judicious application of the
enforcement tools available to her. Guadagno’s savvy use of immigration as a political
lever has continued to serve her ambitions: at the time of writing she was the
Republican nominee for New Jersey’s 2017 gubernatorial election. Economically,
however, the doubling of Monmouth’s immigrant detainee population is exceeded by
the increase achieved in nearby Essex County, whose jail held just 42 detainees in
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2008—the first year of its contract with ICE—and nearly 600 four years later. Through
their entrepreneurial entries into the immigration enforcement marketplace, each
county achieved annual revenue increases in the tens of millions over the first four
years of the Obama administration.

Punit ive im m igr at ion cont r ol under t he aut hor it ar ian st at e
These case studies show a US immigration enforcement marketplace driven by outlier
states, and in turn by entrepreneurial outlier counties within them. Immigrants,
undocumented or otherwise, are not evenly distributed among the nation’s states and
counties; nor is nativist sentiment a universally reliable driver of votes or other kinds of
political support. Perhaps most importantly, the entrepreneurial acumen and
accumulative motivation that appears typical of the actors described in the case studies
above are not evenly distributed across individuals in positions of power within local
governments, regardless of their political ambitions. The nature of entrepreneurship is
innovation; Sheriff Guadagno may not have had the technical knowledge or contacts
necessary to enter Monmouth County into a 287(g) agreement if not for her
background as a federal prosecutor. Ultimately, local government entrepreneurship in
the punitive immigration control marketplace has not needed to be geographically
widespread or evenly distributed to negatively impact the lives of many thousands of
immigrants, along with their families and communities.
Having opened this piece, however, with the argument that the Trump
administration’s immigration enforcement policies represent a continuity from those of
its predecessors, it is important to acknowledge that the potential harms inherent to
these policies are progressing at a rate and to a degree that few predicted. The
administration’s authoritarian approach represents an expanded and inviting framework
for the kind of state- and local-level entrepreneurial entries into the punishment
marketplace explored above. Comparing the federal response to Texas’ recent SB4
anti-immigration law to that which met Arizona’s similar SB1070 in 2010 will provide
a useful litmus test on the federal government’s potential to intensify, rather than
mitigate, the social harms of punishment entrepreneurship. That SB4 specifically
targets ‘sanctuary cities’ is particularly cogent in this respect. The assertion by state
and local governments of humanistic alternatives to the neoliberal/neoconservative
value system that drives discourse on public goods may represent a meaningful site of
resistance to authoritarian neoliberal governance. In Bruff’s (2014: 127) conception,
‘the mobilization of juridical power against such [resistance] […] alert[s] us to how
inequalities of power are produced and reproduced in capitalist societies, [but] also
enable[s] us to consider more fully how other worlds are possible’. Policy innovation
need not be entrepreneurial, accumulative, instrumentalizing; governance frameworks
can be built on values other than market competition. It may be that an experience of
authoritarian rule will provide the stark reminder of these alternative values that US
democracy requires to enact them.
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The recent work of Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2014) indicates that economic elites
exert more real influence on US government policy than any other interest group.
Definitive work from Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Peri (2016) appears to refute the
argument that immigration control has positive labor market effects for native-born workers.
Corrections Corporation of America rebranded in October 2016 as CoreCivic, marking the
‘culmination of [a] multi-year strategy to transform into [a] diversified government
solutions company’ (Davis, 2016) and arguably providing further evidence of the
deliberately obscuring nature of neoliberal language use.
Of 1143 state immigration laws passed from 2010–2015, some 131 (11 percent) related to
employment, as opposed to 78 (7 percent) on public benefits, 178 (16 percent) on law
enforcement, and 151 (13 percent) on ID/driver’s licenses. While no empirical conclusions
can be drawn from this breakdown—the laws are not categorized as pro- or anti-immigrant,
local county or municipal ordinances are not included, there is no detail about their
objectives or enforcement mechanisms—the data do not give the impression of a wave of
restrictive legislative activism targeting employers (NCSL, 2016).
In the ‘competitive’ Marxist capital–labor dialectic, the two constituent groups have
different goals: ‘labor’ represents individual workers seeking advantage in pursuit of ‘life
projects’ (expansively defined), while capital represents corporate interests with more
purely profit-driven/accumulative goals. While it is important to recognize that capital
incorporates individual members of the political-economic elite with ‘life projects’ of their
own, the contemporary structure of neoliberal capitalism obscures capital behind a corporate
collective, while labor’s ability to take a collective approach (i.e. through unionization) is
actively suppressed.
Few of the financiers responsible for this fraud were ever prosecuted, in contrast to the
steady march of harsh punishments directed at the poor in an era when rates of street-level
crime are at their lowest in half a century. Instead, the Justice Department pursued civil
actions against a number of banks and other financial institutions at the center of the
mortgage crisis, achieving fines and financial settlements that, despite setting records,
generally amounted to less than the paying institution’s typical profits for a single quarter.
For more on this topic, see journalist Matt Taibbi’s (2014) book, The Divide: American
Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the constituent agency of the US Department of
Homeland Security responsible for all aspects of interior immigration control, including
detention and deportation.
The 287(g) program, named for the section of the 1996 IIRIRA where it appears, allows
local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration law through a formal agreement
with ICE. The Secure Communities program—now defunct—allowed local LEAs[ A Q6] to
automatically share identifying data on arrestees with ICE, which in turn could request that
deportable arrestees be detained for transfer into ICE custody.
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